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Abstract
Focusing on the domestic policy network around the Blue Amazon paradigm, 
this article challenges the frequently presented argument of Brazil as a key 
player in global environmental governance. In doing so, it applies a policy 
network approach to study the institutional framework that structures the 
country’s engagement in relation to the Antarctica and the Biodiversity Beyond 
National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) negotiation agendas.
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Introduction
The Antarctica Treaty System (ATS) and Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) cases are very different from 
one another, but they are deeply interconnected and complex 
(Jacquet and Jackson 2018; Naish 2017; Mcgee et al. 2018; 
Popova et al. 2019, United Nations Environment 2019). While 
Antarctica has its own regime, based on the 1959 treaty, the BBNJ 
is managed through ongoing negotiations that shall lead to an 
international, legally binding instrument in 20201. These cases are 
highly important, as they constitute strategic frontiers for extractive 
activities that are still poorly regulated (Young 2017; Bähr 2017; 
Cunningham-Hales 2017; Wright et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2019). 
Also, multilateral negotiations concerning bioprospecting regulation 
1  The Second session of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on an international, 
legally binding instrument under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), on 
the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction (BBNJ) took place between March and April, 2019. <https://sdg.iisd.org/events/
second-session-of-the-intergovernmental-conference-on-bbnj/>. Access April 4, 2019.
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remain unconcluded in Antarctica and in the high seas (Tiller et al. 2018; Beckman et al. 2018; 
Dodds et al. 2017; United Nations Environment 2019). Furthermore, each environmental regime 
may be linked to several other regimes, and even form a “regime complex” (Alter and Raustiala 
2018), but each still has its own particular dynamics. 
In 2004, the Brazilian Navy established the notion of “Blue Amazon,” which referred to an 
ocean area of 5,7 million km2, within the Brazilian exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as shown 
in map 1 below. The Blue Amazon is important for geopolitical, diplomatic, environmental 
and economic reasons. Around 85% of Brazilian oil, 75% of natural gas, and 45% of 
fisheries production come from the ocean2. Furthermore, the Blue Amazon area is also deeply 
interconnected with Antarctica and the high seas from a biological, climatic and meteorological 
perspective. Therefore, studying Brazil’s role in global environmental governance through the 
lens of the Blue Amazon sheds light on the intricate relationships between domestic actors and 
the Brazilian diplomacy concerning the Antarctica Treaty System and the Biodiversity Beyond 
National Jurisdiction cases.
Megadiverse countries like Brazil have to adapt to new agendas and challenges, including 
climate change, bioeconomics, and scientific/technological and innovation issues (STI according 
to OECD 2019). These issues cannot be studied through separate levels of analysis – domestic, 
regional, global – but need to be examined in a holistic way, from an integrated systems perspective. 
The policy processes evolving at different – but interconnected – levels of social organization need 
to be contrasted and compared (Young 2008); their mutual effects – be it direct or indirect – need 
to be understood. We therefore apply a “policy network” approach to assess the Brazilian foreign 
policy, based on the Blue Amazon paradigm. Following Rhodes (2008, 426), we understand 
such networks as “sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and 
other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policy 
making and implementation.” 
The policy network approach allows us to transcend separate levels of analysis and to study 
multiple, overlapping, and dynamic relationships, which display a high degree of interdependence. 
At the same time, policy networks allow us to study the decentralization and fragmentation of 
governance arrangements, with power and authority widely diffused amongst governments and 
their sub-units, private businesses, and NGOs. In addition, it corroborates Ostrom’s (2010, 9) 
polycentric governance model when she concludes that:
humans have a more complex motivational structure and more capability to solve 
social dilemmas than posited in earlier rational-choice theory. Designing institutions 
to force (or nudge) entirely self-interested individuals to achieve better outcomes 
has been the major goal posited by policy analysts for governments to accomplish 
for much of the past half-century.
2 <https://www.mar.mil.br/hotsites/amazonia_azul/>. Access February 8, 2019.
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The main question this article ponders is: how has the Blue Amazon policy network engaged 
with the Antarctica and the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction negotiations? In both cases, 
we seek to answer three more specific questions: Has Brazil been a leader, a follower, a reluctant 
participant, or a blocker in multilateral arenas? How have the polar and ocean policies evolved 
in relation to the broader Brazilian foreign policy? To what extent has the Brazilian scientific 
community influenced the Brazilian environmental foreign policies within these fields?
We initially illustrate how Brazil in the recent past wielded the potential to play a key role in 
different regimes, notably regarding biodiversity, based on the Convention on Biological Diversity 
signed in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. We then challenge the myth that Brazil is 
a global environmental player, as the country’s foreign policy achievements vary considerably in 
different regimes over time (Paula 2018), mainly due to conflictive domestic policy networks 
(Barros-Platiau et al. 2012). Finally, we focus on two different cases, - Antarctica and BBNJ - to 
discuss how Brazilian authorities responded to them from 2011 to 2018, including presidents 
Rousseff ’s and Temer’s terms.
Throughout the analysis, we draw upon public policy documents, related literature, as well 
as empirical data from fieldwork, collected by one of the authors in Brasilia, between 2013 and 
2019. In this period, the author participated in a range of public and restricted meetings and 
deliberations concerning the Antarctica and BBNJ agendas. Informal conversations were held 
with actors from agencies and institutions charged with the management of these issue areas, and 
budgetary data presented in following sections was accessed at these meetings. For the purpose of 
this study, observations of deliberations and decision-making processes have provided an overview 
of the patterns of interactions between central agents, access to more sensitive information, and 
also contributed with a firsthand understanding of the institutional contexts within which the 
processes of interest have unfolded (Kawulich 2005). These primary data thereby supplement 
empirical material from the aforementioned sources as the basis for the analysis.
Brazil in multilateral environmental regimes
Despite its varying performance, since the 1992 Earth Summit, Brazil has often been 
considered a key player from the Global South in relation to environmental issues (Lago 2006). 
Within the regimes encompassing forests and biodiversity, taken as a regime complex, Brazil 
traditionally promoted the principles of “sovereignty” and the “right to development” (Lago 
2006; Carvalho 2012), thus hardly accepting international obligations concerning resources under 
Brazilian jurisdiction. Consequently, although the domestic agenda has been rather dissonant 
with the diplomatic agenda (Barros-Platiau et al. 2012), Brazil has played an important role in 
both regimes, sometimes as a promoter, and sometimes as a blocker (Lago 2006; Carvalho 2012; 
Viola and Franchini 2017). It is highly likely that the divergent interests of the Ministry of 
Environment (MMA), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cattle Farming (MAPA) contribute 
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to understanding why Brazil has changed position within different UN negotiations. The most 
emblematic case was probably the Cartagena Protocol negotiations, when Brazil hesitated to join 
the Miami Group. Indeed, Itamaraty (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or MRE) was not fully in 
control of the decision-making process, because no clear “national position” had been established 
(Varella and Barros-Platiau 2000; Guimarães 2002). This seems to have been the case up until 
2018, because the rapports de force among the ministries did not change much over time. 
Within climate change talks under the United Nations auspices, however, the Brazilian 
foreign policy is much more complex. Departing from the domestic arrangements perspective, 
Viola and Franchini (2017) identify a strong correlation between Brazilian deforestation rates 
and the country’s assertiveness in the multilateral climate negotiations, thereby highlighting that 
when deforestation rates were under control, Brasilia had a more active participation in climate 
talks. Thus, from a diplomatic perspective, in 2009 Brazil had the ambition to become a game 
changer in the COP 15 process that led to the Copenhagen Accord. Brazil played a much more 
important role within the BASIC group in 2009 than afterwards, when the country hesitated to 
join the “high ambition coalition” and to promote the Paris Agreement at the COP 21. 
The aforementioned cases show that Brazil lacks a clear environmental diplomacy. Hence, 
diplomatic principles, domestic inter-bureaucratic arrangements, and national resources do not 
suffice to explain the changing Brazilian positions within multilateral environmental agendas. The 
Brazilian diplomacy adopted principles that correspond to the military view of national sovereignty 
over natural resources and non-intervention. Therefore, the main challenge for Itamaraty is to 
cope with domestic policy networks of public and private actors that shape the so-called national 
interest, in a fashion which is often relatively disconnected from the global governance agendas. 
Seen through a broader analytical perspective, Brasilia had the ambition to gain recognition 
from the international community in 2009, notably with Minister Celso Amorim’s “active and 
autonomous” diplomacy (Amorim 2014; 2018). After that, there was a diplomatic watershed, 
since Brasilia abandoned these ambitions under President Dilma Rousseff and President Temer 
(Desiderá Neto et al. 2018; Cervo and Lessa 2014). Brazil was thereby an international “status seeker” 
until President Dilma Rousseff took office, whereafter the country’s relevance within sustainable 
development, environmental, and climate talks gradually decreased. In sum, we consider that the 
Brazilian authorities adopted the sustainable development agenda for its international power projection 
between 1992 and 2010 (Lago 2006; Lima 2017), but that the strategy was subsequently abandoned3.
Brazil’s relevance as a player when negotiating in multilateral or regional arenas and 
different environmental regimes has undoubtedly oscillated since 1992. Thus, when it comes to 
ocean governance, Antarctica or BBNJ, the Brazilian performance in multilateral negotiations 
has been much more limited. We defend that the “national interest” promoted abroad results 
from the operational definitions which were reached within the policy networks that were 
3 Belli and Nasser (2018, 85-120) do not mention the SDGs or the environmental agenda when they describe the Brazilian diplomatic 
planning in “Coupling Multipolarity with Multilateralism.”
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charged with these issue areas. We also claim that oceans (Castro et al. 2007), Antarctica (Câmara 
2017) and fisheries (Organização dos Estados Ibero-Americanos 2018; Cesetti 2019) have not 
been a priority for Brazilian authorities, in spite of successful programs like the ReviZEE4 
on coastal management. 
Because the domestic policy network is based on the Blue Amazon paradigm, it is strongly 
limited with respect to multilateral negotiation agendas concerning global commons. To assess the 
Brazilian foreign policy on Antarctica and the BBNJ, we map the “Blue Amazon” policy network, 
focusing on Brazilian public actors from the executive branch. Nonetheless, we recognize that 
public and private interest groups might also become relevant regarding other issues, such as 
offshore drilling, mining, navigation, bioprospecting, and fishing.
A conceptual outline of the policy-network approach
A critical analysis of the Brazilian policies for the Antarctic and the BBNJ must reach beyond 
interstate relations, and address the causes of policy inefficiency at the domestic level. We focus 
on the policy arrangements of institutions involved in decision-making within these fields, and 
on the patterns of their interactions. For this purpose, we draw on the policy-network literature 
as a useful approach in order to scrutinize the ‘interorganizational logic’ at the meso level of 
policy-making (Atkinson and Coleman 1989, 49). Policy-network analysis has been applied to 
highly different cases and issues, spanning over foreign policy decisions (Serdult and Hirschi 2004) 
and marine environment policy (Bainbridge et al. 2011). Policy networks have been defined as 
“sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other societal actors 
structured around shared, if endlessly negotiated, beliefs and interests in public policy-making 
and implementation’’ (Rhodes 2017, 74-75). A more extensive definition of what Thorfing refers 
to as ‘governance networks,’ has been formulated as:
(1) relatively stable horizontal articulations of interdependent, but operationally 
autonomous actors who (2) interact with one another through negotiations which (3) 
take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework that 
is (4) self-regulating within limits set by external forces and which (5) contributes 
to the production of public purpose (Torfing 2005, 307).
We analyze the network of Brazilian public actors involved in the policy-making process 
around the Antarctic and the BBNJ through an interorganizational perspective that emphasizes 
“the system of relations amongst actors” and the “structured social relationships’’ (Thatcher 
1998, 400) as the explanatory point of departure. As analysis of the internal dynamics and 
4 Program on the Evaluation of Living Resources’ Sustainable Potential in the Exclusive Economic Zone (Programa de Avaliação do Potencial 
Sustentável de Recursos Vivos na Zona Econômica Exclusiva). <https://www.mma.gov.br/biodiversidade/biodiversidade-aquatica/zona-costeira-
e-marinha/programa-revizee>.  Access February 8, 2019.
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changes of policy-networks is often used to explain policy-outcomes (Marsh and Smith 2000; 
Van Bortel 2009) we apply this approach to make sense of the relative efficiency of the two 
policy networks examined, with attention to the interactions between their central participants. 
The structure of a policy network, and the degree to which its internal relations are configured 
around one or more central members, may constitute a decisive factor in explaining its performance. 
‘Centralization’ has been defined as the situation in which a few actors mediate relations within a 
network (Morrisey et al. 199, 61-62). The relative position of network participants on a scale from 
centric to peripheral also determines the significance of actors, as well as the nature of exchange 
relationships between them (Wang 2013, 317). Another important aspect of centralization concerns 
authority, and the distribution of decision-making power amongst network participants, as well 
as their ability to make autonomous decisions (Atkinson and Coleman 1989, 51). Centrally 
positioned agents with considerable authority have thus been characterized as “meta-governors,’’ 
as they assume responsibility for managing the network, and possess both hard and soft control 
instruments (Palm and Backman 2017, 145). A centralized mode of network integration can 
thereby provide a higher degree of effectiveness (Provan and Milward 1995, 25). As formulated 
in hypothesis 1 below, we therefore expect centralization/decentralization to explain variation in 
network efficiency:
Hypothesis 1: Decision-making centralization and relations management within a policy 
network increase its efficiency.  
Another central factor which may determine network efficiency concerns the interorganizational 
process of resource distribution and exchange within a policy network. Because different network 
members possess a variegated array of resources, a mutual dependency relationship arises. As a 
corollary of this dependency, a resource-seeking behavior has been found to spur cooperation 
between network members (Sun and Cao 2018, 601), with more resource-endowed agents making 
use of this circumstance to pursue a leading position (Wang 2013, 318). The relative distribution 
of resources between participants thereby also shapes the relationships between its constituents 
(Marsh and Smith 2000, 10). A fluent and unhampered process of resource exchange is thereby 
critical to facilitate the network’s policy development and performance (Lu et al. 2018, 137). 
Finally, the general availability of resources within the network’s environment also constitutes a 
factor which may enhance its efficiency (Provan and Milward 1995, 27). Upon these considerations, 
we therefore presume that the process of resource exchange and resource availability influences 
the network’s efficiency, as formulated in hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Fluency of resource exchange and resource availability within a policy network 
increase its efficiency. 
In the remainder of this article, we assess these hypotheses with regards to the performance 
of the Blue Amazon policy network in relation to the Antarctica and the BBNJ agenda.
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The Blue Amazon Policy Network
The Brazilian Navy is the key actor within the ocean governance agenda (Mattos 2014; Silva 
2017; Andrade et al. 2018). It coined the Blue Amazon paradigm in 2004, and the Interministerial 
Commission on Marine Resources (CIRM) adopted it to address primarily security and sovereignty 
issues (CIRM 2013)5. Hence, it applies a decisive military approach to ocean governance. In short, the 
Blue Amazon paradigm had a double goal of linking the (green) legal Amazon to the maritime Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf extension, and reinforcing the Navy’s leadership in 
the decision-making processes. The presence of the three military forces is very relevant in the Amazon 
region, and the Navy’s presence is key, because of the transportation logistics and security in watercourses. 
Likewise, the Navy also has the role of main actor concerning the ocean security agenda in Brazil, but 
it works in collaboration with the other forces. For instance, in June 2018 the military-led pilot-project 
Blue Amazon Management System (SIsGAAz)6 was presented, but in mid-2019 it was still not fully 
operational. The map below (Figure 1) gives a more clear idea of the Blue Amazon’s strategic importance.
Figure 1. The Blue Amazon area updated in 2019.
Source: Brazilian Navy <https://www.marinha.mil.br/amazonia-azul>. Access February 20, 2019. Updated version from the White Book 
on Defense (Ministério de Defesa 2016), Ministry of Defense, 39.
5 Comissão Interministerial para os Recursos do Mar. Created in 1974 by the Presidential Decree n. 74.557. Website: <https://www.marinha.
mil.br/secirm/>. Access February 4, 2019.
6 Projeto-piloto do Sistema de Gerenciamento da Amazônia Azul (SisGAAz). <http://www.defesanet.com.br/sisgaaaz/>. Access March 13, 2019.
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The Blue Amazon paradigm has many implications. First, the Navy can be considered 
as a meta-governor for the Blue Amazon Policy network, with strong priorities related to the 
protection of the natural resources under Brazilian jurisdiction (Ministério de Defesa 2016) and 
to the provision of the necessary logistics for the strategic projects and programs. For example, 
the extensions of the Continental Shelf Program (LEPLAC) or the Pre-Salt are two main concerns 
for the Navy. As a result, the Navy has a clear mandate of authority over the other ministerial 
representatives that compose the CIRM.
Second, regarding policies for the sustainable management of biological or mineral marine 
resources, the Navy plays a limited role, although officers usually participate in multilateral meetings 
for Antarctica, BBNJ, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) meetings. While the CIRM’s Executive Secretariat (SECIRM) chaired the 
meetings related to coastal management with GIGERCO (the coastal management group from the 
Ministry of Environment), the military authorities cannot be expected to adopt environmentally- 
or socially-oriented measures related to the oceans in multilateral meetings. 
Third, the 1995 Maritime National Policy is outdated, so a new text, based on more 
sophisticated concepts like OECD’s (2016; 2019) blue economy, bioeconomy and blue strategy 
is still lacking. In spite of the IX Plan for the Sea Resources (PSRM, 2016-2019), there are no 
clear political connections between the green and the blue Amazon yet, except for logistics and the 
scientific research related to ecosystem-based management. Thus, according to the 2019 Presidential 
Act 870, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cattle Farming (MAPA) is responsible for the fisheries 
and aquaculture national policies. Similarly, policies linking the Blue Amazon to the Antarctica 
remain to be designed. Again, the Brazilian scientific community has a key role to communicate 
to decision-makers how climate change and the Ecologically or Biologically Significant Marine 
Areas (EBSAs) issues are interconnected with the oceans governance agenda7.
Fourth, if the green-blue paradigm makes sense for the Navy, it does not really make sense 
from a biological viewpoint, because the paradigm only takes into account resources under national 
jurisdiction, but not beyond it. Therefore, the Blue Amazon paradigm is a geopolitical tool that 
is limited for diplomatic purposes, and even more so for sustainable governance debates. In other 
words, Brazilian authorities still need to account for complex environmental connections between 
Antarctica, the high seas and the EEZ.
Given the centrality of the Navy, and the fact that the Blue Amazon paradigm will most 
likely be reinforced in the future National Maritime Policy, we chose to refer to the policy network 
under analysis as the “Blue Amazon policy network,” represented in Figure 2 below. The policy 
network is the same for both cases, that is, the main actors are the same, but their performance 
in the ATS case is much superior to the BBNJ case. The Navy is the main actor and the Ministry 
7 Brazilian scientists agreed on that during the I Brazilian Ocean Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation (I Fórum Brasileiro de Ciência, 
Tecnologia e Inovação para os Oceanos). It was organized by CGOA/Ministry of Science, Technology Information and Communication, on 
21-23 May, 2019. The final document, entitled “Carta de Todos os Santos” mentions this communication challenge. Some Navy officers 
participated, but diplomats and representatives from the Ministry of Environment did not.
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of Science and Technology seems to be the second most important actor. Surprisingly, Itamaraty 
and the Ministry of Environment played very limited roles, whereas the Ministry of Mining 
and Energy retained an important function related to mining activities and the expansion of the 
continental shelf (LEPLAC Program).









In Antarctica’s case, the policy network is structured around the CIRM, which is the maritime 
authority, and part of the Navy/Ministry of Defense (MD). In fact, the Brazilian Antarctic program 
(PROANTAR) directly contributed to the consolidation of the CIRM as the policy network 
authority. The Commission was composed of fifteen other ministries, the Presidential cabinet 
representative, and the Harbor Secretariat. Besides the Navy, we identified three other main 
actors within the network: the Ministry of Science, Technology, Information and Communication 
(MCTIC), Itamaraty (MRE) and the Ministry of Environment (MMA). Although not formally 
recognized as members, scientists play an important role within the debates. Because they participate 
in domestic and international meetings with ministries and congressional representatives, they 
come close to the concept of an epistemic community in the sense of Haas (2008)8.
8 Professor Paulo Eduardo Câmara from the Institute of Biology participated in the 2018 and 2019 Antarctica Treaty Meetings of the Parties 
(ATCM). Professor Carina Costa de Oliveira from the Law Faculty participated in the III session of the Intergovernmental Conference on an 
international, legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the conservation and sustainable 
use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction in 2019. They are both from the University of Brasilia and were 
invited to participate with the Brazilian official delegation.
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The main initiatives related to Antarctica are submitted to CIRM, such as the PROANTAR 
program and the construction of the 2019 scientific research station (Escobar 2016), logistics, 
regional meetings (RAPAL), and the planned acquisition of an icebreaker. Interministerial meetings 
take place in the CIRM and other stakeholders can be invited, notably from the scientific community. 
Civil society representatives may also participate, depending on the agenda. However, congressional 
representatives from the Antarctica Caucus9 rarely participate in the meetings. Furthermore, with 
the 2019 ministerial reform under President Bolsonaro, the Ministry of Defense will continue to 
be the focal point for the Antarctica agenda.
Concerning the BBNJ negotiations, the policy network is not well-structured around the 
CIRM, as mentioned above. Itamaraty, the Ministry for Science & Technology, and to a lesser 
extent, the Ministry of Environment, jointly manage the marine biodiversity agenda. In this 
case, the Navy has less authority, since biodiversity is a typically environmental issue, although it 
does comprise an environmental department, and sends an officer to take part in the multilateral 
meetings mentioned above. Even though the four ministerial representatives meet frequently before 
multilateral meetings, they do not necessarily share the same priorities. Our observations indicate 
that the Oceans, Antarctica and Geosciences Office (CGOA, subordinated to the Department on 
Science Policies and Programs in MCTIC) considers ocean biodiversity to be a higher priority 
than the other network participants. CGOA was the key Brazilian actor for the signature and 
implementation of the 2017 Belém Statement on cooperation for research and innovation in the 
Atlantic Ocean, signed with the European Union and South Africa, as well as the AANChOR 
project10, and the creation of the National Institute for Ocean Research, in July 2019.
The MMA focuses more on land/water biodiversity and coastal management, and the 
ocean and fisheries secretariat was recently closed down. Ocean-related projects are either in 
the Biodiversity Secretariat (SBIO) or the Water Resources Secretariat (SRH), and Itamaraty 
clearly appears to have shifted its priorities. After the 2019 ministerial reform, the Environmental 
Department (DMA) and the Seas, Antarctica and Space Division (DMAE) were placed under 
the Citizenship and Sovereignty Secretariat11. Despite the fact that the three ministries recently 
underwent structural reforms, there is no clear sign that this situation will change dramatically 
in the near future. In other words, the Ministry of Sciences & Technology was empowered, 
while the two others saw their BBNJ agendas considerably reduced. Namely, Itamaraty will 
likely deal less with climate and environmental issues, while the MMA will be less engaged with 
planetary politics. In order to account for the variation in the Blue Amazon policy-network’s 
efficiency with regards to the ATS and the BBNJ respectively, we focus on centralization and 
resource distribution in the following section.
9 The Frente Parlamentar Mista de Apoio ao Programa Antártico Brasileiro is composed of senators and Lower House representatives who 
support the Antarctica agenda. They can propose parliamentary amendments and ensure complementary funding. In 2017, they provided 
around one million dollars to PROANTAR. <http://www.cristovam.org.br/portal2017/2017/06/21/frente-parlamentar-mista-de-apoio-ao-
programa-antartico-brasileiro-anuncia-nova-estacao-brasileira/>. Access January 3, 2019.
10 All Atlantic Cooperation for Ocean Research and innovation
11 Secretaria de Assuntos de Cidadania e Soberania Nacional (SASN) <www.itamaraty.gov.br.> Access February 8, 2019.
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Centralization and resource distribution within the Blue Amazon  
policy network
The Brazilian policy network for Antarctica has been relatively centralized since the 
creation of the CIRM, which is also reflected in the decision-making process. The management 
of relations proved to be much more efficient than we expected prior to this research in 
early 2014. In fact, the Navy officials and other CIRM members maintain close contact 
within Congress, in the ministries, national research centers, and universities. Navy officers 
also organize public scientific events around Brazil to debate and raise awareness on issues 
such as scientific research and geopolitics (Gandra and Simões 2013; Andrade et al. 2018). 
Therefore, the network is centralized and rather well managed. In terms of interaction patterns, 
the Antarctica stakeholders are a small group of old partners that could be considered an 
“elite,” - except for diplomats, who change frequently. With respect to the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings, the network actors meet in the CIRM to prepare the agenda and the 
position papers. They also deliberate regarding the national funding calls for research projects, 
as it was the case for the 2018 PROANTAR call, worth 5,1 million USD12. Furthermore, 
these institutions share strong, long-lasting links. The network’s efficiency therefore appears 
to be enhanced by the centralized institutional arrangement in Brasilia, and by the priority 
that the Navy and the Ministry of Science, Technology, Information and Communication give 
the agenda, with the support of Brazilian polar scientists. Finally, the main limitations are 
not political disagreements, but rather stem from uncertainties about logistics and funding 
every year.
The biodiversity network is much broader than the BBNJ, which is underfunded, and 
decentralized. Fernandes et al. (2017) accentuate the negative impacts of Brazilian funding 
gaps for effective biodiversity management. There is no clear leadership, and each ministry 
has its own mandate and agendas. Their interests generally converge, but there is polarization 
between the Navy and Itamaraty on one side, and the MMA on the other. The best example 
are the EBSA talks, in which the former adopted a more nationalist approach, which diverged 
from the MMA’s perspective. They struggled to build a fragile domestic consensus with the 
support of MCTIC. In the specific case of marine biodiversity, we found that the link between 
Itamaraty and the Ministry of Science, Technology, Information and Communication is the 
strongest in the network, because these are the most frequent participants in multilateral 
meetings and international projects. The Navy’s participation is limited, which is also the case 
for the Ministry of Environment. In sum, the lack of centralization seems to be a key factor in 
limiting the network’s efficiency in the BBNJ case. Concerning the 2018-2019 negotiations, 
no clear diplomatic strategy was identified, although Brazil has some strong lines of action, 
12 That is R$ 18 million, converted at 3.5 exchange rate. <http://www.mctic.gov.br/mctic/opencms/salaImprensa/noticias/arquivos/2018/08/
Novas_pesquisas_na_Antarticaterao_mais_R_18_milhoes.html>. Access March 10, 2019.
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notably within the G77/China group and the Like-Minded Latin American Countries13, around 
the principle of the right to development14. 
In both cases, we consider that there were quite distinct processes of resource exchange, 
Antarctica being better structured than the BBNJ. The resource availability, considering personnel, 
information, and funding capacity, also varies considerably between them. In the Antarctica case, 
the mutual dependency relationship is based mainly on the distribution of personnel and funding 
capacity. The CIRM and the Ministry of Science, Technology, Information and Communication 
- through the CGOA - have stable and well-prepared staff. Both of them, along with the scientific 
community, produce valuable information that is shared frequently. An example is the Working 
Paper 27 “An enhanced definition on Bioprospection in Antarctica,” which Brazil presented in the 
XLI ATCM in Buenos Aires, in 2018, in collaboration with members of the scientific community. 
The funding comes from the MD, MCTIC, National Fund for Scientific and Technological 
Development (FNDCT) and Congress, but the budget is limited and uncertain. While the Navy 
has the strongest funding capacity, its budget covers logistics and security, such as the new research 
station, equipments and ships. Table 1 below illustrates the funding for Antarctica from two 
different sources, the Navy and Congress:
Table 1. Budget for Antarctica in US$








Source: Brazilian Navy. Meeting “A Reconstrução da Estação Antártica Comandante Ferraz”. Câmara dos Deputados, 6/21/2017. 
Exchange rate: 3.5
For 2019, the planned PROANTAR funding is shown in Table 2 below. Although the Navy 
needs the airplanes and a vessel with operational capacities in the Antarctic to assure logistics to 
the new scientific station, the acquisitions may take longer than expected.
13 http://enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb25186e.pdf. Access April 4, 2019.
14 Second and Third sessions of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on an international, legally binding instrument under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction (BBNJ). https://sdg.iisd.org/events/second-session-of-the-intergovernmental-conference-on-bbnj/. Access April 4, 2019. And 
the International meeting “Biodiversidade em Áreas além das Jurisdições Nacionais”. Itamaraty/DMAE, Brasília, 2017.
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Table 2. 2019 PROANTAR Federal Funding in US$
Label Amount
Discretionary expenses 10.800.000
Acquisition of three airplanes 11.400.000
Research station expenses 17.100.000
Air Force operations 2.850.000
Acquisition of a polar ship 60.500.000
Source: The Brazilian Navy. Meeting “A Reconstrução da Estação Antártica Comandante Ferraz”. Câmara dos Deputados, 6/21/2017. 
Exchange rate: 3.5
In 2018, the funding agencies from the Ministries of Education (CAPES) and Sciences & 
Technology (CNPq) underwrote a USD 5,1 million call for research, after three years of expectations, 
as the previous call was launched in 2015. However, the Division within Itamaraty (DMAE) has 
a very limited staff and almost nonexistent funding capacity. The scientific community15 is small 
and lacks funding as well. Congress, in turn, lacks information, participation in CIRM or other 
interministerial meetings and trained staff, but the Antarctica Caucus members have the means to 
propose financing research through congressional funding, as shown in Table 1 above, especially 
in 2018. Consequently, the scarce availability of resources within the network’s environment 
shapes the relationship, because the military, the MCTIC staff and scientists have to convince 
congressional representatives to help finance Antarctica research every year. This is a clear sign of 
lack of political commitment and diplomatic strategy, and the relative scarcity of funding appears 
to somewhat limit the network efficiency.
Concerning the BBNJ agenda, the network is much larger, but there are only three ministries 
involved in leading positions: the Ministry of Science, Technology, Information and Communication 
(CGOA), Itamaraty, and the Ministry of Environment. The two first Ministries had their funding 
capacity reduced during the period analyzed. Considering Brazil’s extensive territory and the national 
sustainable development agenda, the Ministry of Environment has been chronically underfunded, 
so it has sought international funding. Even though the Ministry of Environment has traditionally 
engaged in strong international cooperation projects, allowing for a more active participation in 
multilateral and national projects, this is not the case with the BBNJ debates. So, the network’s 
inefficiency is strongly related to the dysfunctional distribution and low availability of resources, 
and the lack of priority given to the ongoing negotiations. Finally, the Ministry of Defense was 
not considered as relevant as the others in the BBNJ case, but it holds a strong position in terms of 
opposing international obligations that could be considered compromising to national sovereignty.
In sum, the Brazilian role in the BBNJ multilateral negotiations has been deeply affected 
by domestic mismanagements and a lack of resource allocation since 1992. Furthermore, the 
Blue Amazon policy network has not yet encouraged domestic actors to adequately discuss 
15 There are currently 48 research groups with the keyword “Antarctica” on the CNPq/Ministry of Science and Technology website 
<http://lattes.cnpq.br/web/dgp>. Access March 9, 2019 . For “biodiversity,” there are 1264 groups on the same website.
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the ocean agenda. What is more, fisheries are not considered a priority in Brazil (Castro et al. 
2007; Organização dos Estados Ibero-Americanos 2018; Cesetti 2019). The last dataset about 
fisheries was published in 2007 by IBAMA (Brazilian Environmental Institute), although there 
is a satellite system which is supposed to be monitoring fishing boats (PREPS). It can thereby 
be concluded that the lack of commitment and priority means that the Blue Amazon policy 
network is very superficially engaged within the BBNJ multilateral negotiations, although the 
name suggests the opposite.
Another central question relates to the manner in which the ATS and BBNJ agendas are 
internally connected within public official documents. Throughout the 186-page long 2016 White 
Book on Defense, only three paragraphs are devoted to Antarctica, two to the Blue Amazon, within 
the section entitled “International Sea Regimes, Antarctica and Space,” and none to BBNJ. Within 
Itamaraty, these agendas are not clearly linked, except in relation to promoting scientific research. 
The White Book on Defense (Ministério de Defesa 2016, 41) states that scientific research in 
Antarctica is paramount for Brazil. It recognizes the role of Antarctica related to atmospheric 
and ocean regulation, to the climate regime in Brazil, and the influence of the Austral Ocean for 
fisheries and aquaculture on the Brazilian coast. Naturally, there are international projects and 
scientific initiatives connecting Antarctica to BBNJ, and the new maritime policy is expected to 
catch up with recent debates.
Conclusion
The fact that Brazil is a megadiverse country, and at times has been a global environmental 
player, does not help to fully understand Brazilian diplomacy related to the oceans and Antarctica, 
even though the four selected ministries are the same in most negotiations and meetings. One 
important reason for that is the fact that ocean governance and the sustainable management of 
marine living resources are not a political, military or diplomatic priority.
The Blue Amazon is Brazil’s main foreign policy paradigm for ocean governance, and it 
empowers the Navy as the meta-governor of a domestic network that involves other ministries, 
scientists and NGOs. Although the Blue Amazon paradigm is useful from a military perspective 
to “protect” natural resources under national jurisdiction from threats like illegal fishing and 
bioprospecting, its usefulness is limited for ocean governance negotiations that are broader than 
the security scope.
We analyzed the relative efficiency of the Blue Amazon policy network in its engagement 
with the ATS and BBNJ negotiations, explaining its performance according to this network’s 
1) centralization, and 2) resource distribution. Regarding the degree of network centralization, 
we found noticeable differences between the ATS and the BBNJ agendas. While the Navy is the 
main authority in Brazil concerning Antarctica, there is no designated authority for BBNJ. Three 
ministries share the marine biodiversity agenda: Itamaraty, Environment and Science, Technology, 
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Information and Communication, but BBNJ is not a priority for them. None of them can be 
considered the leader in the policy network, although the latter plays a key role in international 
cooperation projects. While centralization contributes to the relative effectiveness of the policy 
network for Antarctica, the absence of this condition appears to determine its ineffectiveness 
concerning BBNJ, which seems to support hypothesis 1. Future research may unveil whether 
centralization is a good option for managing the sustainable use of marine biodiversity resources, 
or whether Ostrom’s polycentric governance model might constitute a more fruitful approach to 
advance Brazilian stakeholders’ interests related to BBNJ.
In general, resource availability is higher in the case of Antarctica compared to the BBNJ, and 
its distribution is more balanced, notably concerning staff, funding and information. The Navy 
has maintained its role of assuring training and logistics to the continent, but it does not provide 
funding for scientific research. Information circulates well, and the polar scientific community 
participates in the decision-making processes within the policy network. While distribution of 
variegated resources between network participants has been efficient in the ATS case, their general 
availability has nonetheless been restricted. The 2018 PROANTAR call to fund research and the 
WP27 presented in the 2018 Antarctica Treaty Meeting resulted from proactive joint efforts from 
public authorities and scientists. With regard to the policy network’s engagement with the BBNJ 
agenda, resources such as funding and information are scattered in the public and private sectors, 
including international entities. Staff is more numerous but less prepared, and the scientific 
community does not hold the same importance in the decision-making process as in the Antarctica 
case. The differences in terms of resource distribution thereby help to explain the relatively more 
efficient performance of the policy network in relation to the Antarctica compared to BBNJ, 
thereby lending some weight to hypothesis 2, - although both have faced funding problems. As a 
result, the lack of means allocated to the Blue Amazon policy network appears to have moderately 
limited Brazilian foreign policy concerning the Antarctica, and significantly curtailed efforts in 
relation to the BBNJ agenda.
With regard to the question of how the Blue Amazon policy network’s performance has 
positioned Brazil within multilateral arenas concerned with these agendas, we can conclude 
that in the case of the BBNJ, it has been insufficient to provide Brazil with domestic consensus. 
The Navy focused more on expanding the continental shelf, security and defense issues than on 
planetary politics. Itamaraty does not have a strong negotiating position within the ongoing UN 
talks, and has been acting within the G77/China and the Like-Minded Latin American Countries. 
Within the incipient BBNJ regime, multilateral decisions made so far show how difficult it is 
to build consensus with several economic sectors and pre-existing regimes, notably in relation 
to bioprospecting and fisheries. In this context, Brazil failed to build a domestic consensus and 
promote biodiversity in the high seas as a diplomatic priority. Consequently, Brazil has been a 
distant follower of the most pressing issues in the ongoing multilateral negotiations, and it is 
clearly an underachiever.
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Concerning the ATS agenda, the relatively better-organized policy network appears to have 
had some modest effect on Brazil’s engagement within multilateral arenas, though the country 
might still be classified as a distant follower. In this case, Brazil’s limited achievements in the 
ATS seem to stem from the fact that only the Navy, the CGOA and a small polar scientific 
community consider Antarctica a priority. Public authorities from the executive and legislative 
branches still have to be convinced how Antarctica, the high seas and the Blue Amazon area 
are interconnected in terms of climate, weather and ecology.
In broad terms, considering the policy network performance, the Brazilian foreign 
policy related to ATS and BBNJ was relatively constant during the period analyzed. As scarce 
attention has been devoted to these issue areas, results appear to have been contingent on the 
initiative and commitment of specific network actors. The 2019 ministerial reforms might 
imply significant changes in the future, as it is likely that only Antarctica will be considered 
a priority. The scientific community appears to have played a significant role in relation to 
the ATS and BBNJ agendas, which nonetheless has been constrained by limited funding. 
Future research on the Brazilian scientific community’s role in the decision-making process 
is necessary, notably after the creation of the National Institute for Ocean Research (INPO). 
The Institute shall contribute to bridge the BBNJ case with the Blue Amazon policy network, 
since only Antarctica is connected to the Blue Amazon paradigm through the Navy’s efforts. 
Because Antarctica and the BBNJ are two new strategic frontiers, the forthcoming Brazilian 
maritime policy has many complex challenges to tackle, starting with the implementation of 
a robust “blue strategy” within the policy network.
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